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In 1967 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber published Le defi amer-
icain, a call to beware of American multinationals buying up 
the world. In the 1980s and 1990s it was Japan’s turn, spawn-
ing books like Clyde Prestowitz’s 1993 Trading Places: How We 
Are Giving Our Future to Japan. Today it is China’s outbound 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) that elicits the most anxiety.1 
1. For clarity, we refer to direct investment into China as foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and direct investment out of China as outbound foreign direct 
investment (OFDI). As opposed to portfolio investment, we use the term “di-
China’s OFDI has reached commercially and geoeconomically 
significant levels and begun to challenge international invest-
ment  norms  and  affect  international  relations.  Yet  China’s 
OFDI profile is poorly understood. Seen in context, China is a 
laggard in global investment, and the country faces considerable 
internal impediments to overcoming its disadvantaged position. 
Because of this, more-advanced economies can leverage their 
experience and comparative advantage as global investors to 
work with China in the international investment policy arena. 
This policy brief helps clarify the size, intent, sophistication, and 
sustainability of China’s OFDI in order to lay the groundwork 
for related policy debates. 
A  number  of  deals  and  policy  measures  announced  in 
the first half of 009 indicate an inflection point for China’s 
OFDI. With the economic crisis depressing asset prices world-
wide,  Chinese  firms  have  launched  multibillion  dollar  bids 
for distressed resource firms, and the Chinese government is 
promoting  outbound  investment  by  easing  and  decentraliz-
ing regulatory procedures, broadening financing channels for 
firms with overseas ambitions, and openly advertising China’s 
international investment appetite.3 At the same time, however, 
global economic turbulence is making potential Chinese inves-
tors insecure. A recent survey found that more than half of 
Chinese firms are scaling back their overseas investment plans 
in response to the crisis (APFC and CCPIT 009). The value 
of approved nonfinancial overseas projects in the first quarter of 
009 dropped to $3.7 billion, from more than $10 billion in 
the same period last year. The Chinese government has become 
more cautious as well, withholding approval for deals in the 
rect investment” only for long-term cross-border investment with a final stake 
of greater than 10 percent, following the OECD’s widely used benchmark 
definition of FDI (OECD 008a).
. We will publish a longer study on this topic later in 009. 
3. Recent examples of greater international action include Chinese investment 
delegations’ travel to OECD countries in the spring of 009; several bilateral 
free trade agreements with far-reaching investment provisions, such as with 
Peru in April 009; and the front-loading of an investment agreement in an 
initiative with Taiwan in May 009.
. The registered 008Q1 OFDI volume was $19.3 billion, including finan-
cial deals like Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s (ICBC) $5.6 billion 
investment in South African Standard Bank and other high-profile deals, like 
Chinalco’s $13 billion stake in the Australian mining firm Rio Tinto.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4   J u Ne   2 0 0 9
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financial sector and publicly rebuking several high-profile firms 
in other sectors for their overseas investment plans.5
Despite  short-term  anxieties,  Chinese  OFDI  is  poised 
to  grow  markedly  in  the  medium  and  long  terms,  and  the 
importance of these investments to Chinese firms is changing 
fundamentally as the nation confronts the need to rebalance its 
growth model. For 30 years China has sustained high growth by 
producing goods for export to the world without a significant 
presence in the world beyond its borders. Expanding economies 
of scale in domestic manufacturing is no longer sufficient to fuel 
growth, and China’s firms are increasingly being forced to fight 
for the vast profit margins they have traditionally conceded to 
foreign partners able to operate abroad. 
Meanwhile Beijing is publicly talking about making direct 
investments abroad as an alternative to holding US government 
debt securities, complementing the economic motives of China’s 
firms. The implication that real-economy direct investments are 
somehow a menu option for investments otherwise made by 
official government entities casts a mercantilist light on China’s 
outbound investment. In addition to stoking concerns about 
the demand for US treasuries, this talk may raise special national 
security questions about otherwise welcome investment inflows 
to a US economy in need of increased investment. 
The changing nature of China’s global OFDI position is a 
core concern for China’s government and firms alike, and there-
fore the policy response from the United States, Europe, and 
elsewhere will be critical. The range of policy issues raised by 
China’s outbound investment is extensive:
n	 Connecting  Chinese  OFDI  with  other  global  chal-
lenges: A successful integration of China into open cross-
border investment flows will be necessary to solve some 
of the world’s most urgent challenges. Mercantilist invest-
ment protectionism both in and against China would have 
negative consequences in a number of international policy 
areas, such as building a new climate policy regime and 
addressing  old  concerns  in  international  development. 
5. The Bank of China did not receive approval for its $30 million investment 
in the French bank Rothschild, while the auto firm Geely and the machinery 
manufacturer Sany were publicly rebuked for their ambitious expansion plans.
Chinese investment flows can make positive contributions 
to global recovery and economic development in the years 
ahead.
n	 Improving  investment  flow  transparency:  China  and 
other countries have aligned interests in securing a more-
transparent  global  investment  environment,  such  as 
through limiting the use of tax havens to hide FDI flows 
from regulators.6 But China’s OFDI data are out of line 
with international standards, and the value, destination, 
and sectoral mix of its OFDI are unclear. Maximizing the 
benefits of foreign direct investment requires better statisti-
cal clarity.
n	 Limiting  national  security  concerns  in  an  era  of 
high-value  mergers  and  acquisitions:  Chinese  OFDI 
will  increasingly  target  higher-value  assets  in  advanced 
economies, as commercial competitiveness joins resource 
security as a first-order motivation. This will increase the 
temptation  for  governments  and  firms  in  the  nations 
where China invests to use national security arguments to 
block  these  new  entrants. Worldwide,  the  commitment 
to cross-border investment openness is already shaky and 
protectionist sentiment is on the rise. Potential recipients 
of Chinese investments must not invoke national security 
inappropriately and should be more forthright about off-
limit sectors. 
n	 Grappling with national economic security: Attempts by 
some US firms and protectionist politicians to expand the 
US investment review system to include economic secu-
rity irrespective of national security have been rebuffed in 
the past. However, China’s size and pervasive government 
involvement in its commercial sector are rekindling this 
debate. Policymakers worry about the impact of noncom-
mercial bidders on a market system, and concerns that 
official subsidies support China’s OFDI are pervasive. Talk 
in Beijing about “using” corporate OFDI as an alternative 
to buying US treasuries only increases worry about finan-
cial  security.  Corporate  bailouts  worldwide  have  lately 
made China’s firms less exceptional in terms of govern-
ment ownership and control, but western officials remain 
concerned about China in particular. Chinese executives 
need  clear  US  policy  to  determine  beforehand  whether 
bids may be rejected on national security grounds, and 
greater clarity on this issue would benefit the United States 
both by maximizing its asset values and preventing tit-for-
tat treatment abroad. 
6. Increased transparency and better information-sharing were major objec-
tives articulated by China in the run-up to and during the G-0 meetings in 
November 008 and April 009. 
China’s OFDI has reached commercially and 
geoeconomically significant levels and 
begun to challenge international investment 
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n	 Fixing  China’s  domestic  impediments:  Some  of  the 
biggest obstacles to China’s firms going abroad are home-
grown: lack of corporate vision and experience, inadequate 
overseas  management  skills,  and  schizophrenic  political 
attitudes.  Foreign  officials,  whether  seeking  to  attract 
investment from China or to prevent it, must recognize 
this. China should avoid rushing to blame foreign invest-
ment rules and instead address firm-level and policy short-
comings.  Otherwise,  misdiagnoses  of  impediments  will 
result in recriminations and protectionism in China and 
abroad. 
n	 Cementing an open investment environment: China’s 
national interest in an open environment for cross-border 
investment is increasing along with the economic forces 
that are pushing its firms abroad. The coming decade will 
offer a window of opportunity not only to integrate China 
into  existing  investment  frameworks  but  also  to  jointly 
move beyond current investment regimes. 
In  the  following  sections  we  provide  the  background 
analysis needed to address these issues. This includes a review 
of China’s OFDI profile in light of other financial flows and 
compared  with  other  countries,  the  changing  forces  driving 
Chinese investment, and an analysis of barriers and impedi-
ments both homegrown and foreign. Finally we elaborate our 
principal policy findings.
CHINA’S CURRENT OFDI PROFILE
The history of outbound investment flows from China is short 
but spectacular. Virtually nonexistent on the eve of the economic 
reforms beginning in 1978, OFDI remained insignificant through 
00. But by 007 the annual volume of OFDI had grown to 
around $5 billion, only to double to more than $50 billion in 
008 (figure 1). The stock of Chinese cross-border investments 
reached approximately $170 billion at year-end 008.7
Data Accuracy and Potential Distortions
While the quality of China’s data on cross-border investment has 
improved significantly over the past decade, reliability remains a 
serious concern. The primary official source for data on Chinese 
OFDI  is  the  Annual  Statistical  Bulletin  on  China’s  Outward 
7. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) recorded a stock of 
$169 billion in its 008 International Investment Position (IIP). By adding the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s (MOFCOM) 007 stock number ($118 
billion) to the preliminary number for 008 flows ($5 billion), we arrive at 
roughly the same number, although stocks are usually not measured as just the 
accumulation of flows but are adjusted for depreciation and asset revaluation.
Direct Investment, which is compiled by the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) and copublished with the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Secondary sources for OFDI data 
are China’s Balance of Payments (BOP) and International Invest-
ment  Position  (IIP),  both  published  by  SAFE.  The  Bulletin 
covers OFDI flows and stock based on investment approvals in 
the respective year, whereas the BOP/IIP numbers are based on 
actual recorded outflows yearly. Although authorities conform 
in principle to internationally recognized standards, including 
the OECD’s Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment 
(OECD 008a) and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Balance of Payments Manual, compilation methods are not fully 
consistent with these standards in practice, and MOFCOM’s 
exact methodology for gathering OFDI data is opaque.8 
Several factors distort the accuracy of China’s aggregate data 
on OFDI. First, MOFCOM does not rely on direct enterprise 
surveys to compile data but rather on information collected by 
local commerce bureaus, where firms must register their over-
seas investments. This can result in significant underreporting 
by firms that wish to side-step approval procedures for a variety 
of reasons, thus dragging down the aggregate figures. Another 
major  problem,  resulting  in  undercounting,  is  that  many 
Chinese firms do not report foreign earnings that are reinvested 
abroad as OFDI as required by international standards.9 While 
these factors suggest that actual outflows could be much higher, 
there are also reasons to suspect that China’s official statistics 
are too high. Limited capital account convertibility has long 
been understood as a motive to disguise hot money flows by 
overstating  or  understating  direct  investment  values.  Efforts 
to bring hot money out of the country may partly explain the 
sharp increase of outbound investment over the past four years. 
Another  factor  potentially  contributing  to  overstatement  of 
OFDI is “round-tripping”: reporting OFDI (mostly to Hong 
Kong or tax havens) only to bring it back into China in order 
to  enjoy  preferential  FDI  treatment  and  other  advantages.10 
There are no official estimates for round-tripping money flows, 
but some analysts think it could be more than one third of all 
inward FDI.11 These distorting factors are known, but it is hard 
to weight them and to decide whether the aggregate number is 
understated or overstated.
8. For a discussion of China’s compliance with international FDI statistics, see 
OECD (008b).
9. We learned this in interviews with industry executives and policymakers in 
Beijing and Shanghai in November 008 and March 009.
10. Some of the financial advantages enjoyed by foreign investors in China, 
including favorable tax treatment, have been phased out in recent years. But 
formally or informally, advantages remain in many circumstances.
11. Xiao (00) suggests that 30 to 50 percent of FDI is money first siphoned 
out of the country in some way. N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4   J u Ne   2 0 0 9
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Unclear Disaggregated Data 
The details in China’s OFDI data are even more unclear than 
the  aggregate.  The  confusion  begins  with  the  geographical 
distribution of OFDI, which is almost completely obscured. 
MOFCOM statistics provide an overview of Chinese OFDI by 
destination region and country. However this is based not on 
survey data but on information Chinese companies submit in 
the registration and approval process. Firms tend to report the 
first, not the final, destination of their investments, weighting 
the numbers toward stop-over locations such as Hong Kong 
and  tax  havens  such  as  the  Cayman  Islands,  the  Bahamas, 
and  the  British Virgin  Islands.  In  MOFCOM  data  around 
80 percent of Chinese OFDI stock lies in Hong Kong or tax 
havens (figure ).
Just as OFDI is obscured by passing through stop-over 
locations,  industry  categories  are  not  final,  and  MOFCOM 
data on the sectoral composition of the OFDI stock are distort-
ed as well. In addition these statistics rely not on the Interna-
tional Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) system but on a 
Chinese alternative, so China’s figures are not internationally 
comparable. Likewise, the data do not permit cross-referencing 
of regional and industrial distribution. A more accurate data 
set would help policymakers inside and outside China better 
understand the country’s OFDI profile and allay some anxieties. 
For instance, aggregates from commercial mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A) databases suggest that the regional and sectoral 
distribution of China’s OFDI is more diverse than commonly 
thought (appendix 1 table 1).1
Another  metric  that  is  important  for  policymakers  and 
regulators abroad is the entry mode of Chinese investments. 
Cross-border investment can take place through “greenfield” 
projects (building new facilities from scratch), or by buying 
existing assets through mergers or acquisitions. Chinese author-
ities do not release regular official information on the share of 
each entry mode, and using available M&A data is difficult 
because many Chinese firms use special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
in third countries, including Hong Kong and Singapore, to 
make acquisitions. Our M&A data set suggests that around 60 
to 70 percent of total Chinese OFDI volume can be attributed 
to M&A deals, with the top three deals accounting for more 
than two thirds of the total M&A volume (figure 3).13 
1. Note that our M&A sample only includes direct, cross-border M&A deals 
of mainland Chinese companies with a final stake of 10 percent or more.
13. The share of direct M&A for 008 shown in figure 3 is exceptionally low 
because several high-profile deals involved special purpose vehicles (SPV) in 
third countries, such as Chinalco’s $1 billion stake in Rio Tinto, which was 
executed through an SPV in Singapore.  
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Figure 1     China’s annual OFDI flows, 1982–2008, MOFCOM and SAFE
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Insufficient Investor Transparency
Even  less  is  known  about  Chinese  investors  on  the  micro 
level. A range of government bodies and government-backed 
entities, including SAFE, the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC, China’s sovereign wealth fund), and the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF), hold overseas assets, and recently the 
state-owned China Development Bank (CDB) and the China 
Export-Import Bank (Exim) have begun to massively expand 
their  overseas  loan  portfolios,  often  including  long-term  oil 
delivery contracts.1 The lack of transparency surrounding these 
deals  fuels  perceptions  that  Chinese  investment  is  all  about 
government-directed  vehicles.  In  reality,  these  state  entities 
usually take minor stakes, and only in a very few cases do the 
stakes exceed the 10 percent threshold needed to qualify as FDI. 
In short, it is China’s firms that generate the country’s outbound 
FDI action.
Large state-owned firms with protected domestic market 
shares, especially in the natural resources, infrastructure, and 
logistics sectors, began investing overseas as early as the 1980s, 
1. The volume of announced overseas loans by the CDB and the China Exim 
Bank totaled $6 billion from January to April 009, with $5 billion to Rus-
sia, $10 billion to Brazil, $5 billion to Kazakhstan, $ billion to Venezuela, $1 
billion to Angola, and $1 billion to Ecuador.
and they still dominate the deal tables due to the inherently 
large project costs in these sectors. But the picture based on 
past deal value misrepresents the range of corporate actors and 
changes in recent years. According to MOFCOM, more than 
7,000 Chinese firms ran a total of more than 10,000 overseas 
investment projects as of 007. The number of firms going 
abroad each year grew from approximately 1,000 in 00–06 to 
around 1,500 in 007 and 008.15 The actual number is likely 
to be much higher, given that many firms circumvent registra-
tion and approval processes.16 Unfortunately, MOFCOM does 
not publish a comprehensive aggregate list of firms engaged in 
OFDI by ownership, industry, or size. Such a breakdown would 
show  that  the  momentum  is  in  new  sectors  and  no  longer 
coming solely from state-owned resource companies (appendix 
1 table ). 
Finally, the general murkiness of China’s corporate gover-
nance structures effects perceptions of OFDI motives. In the 
United States, shareholders motivated by profit can compel firm 
management to justify investment plans. In China, sharehold-
15. These numbers are calculated from information included in the annual 
MOFCOM bulletins. 
16. Some of our interview partners, among them government officials, 
estimated that the official statistics only capture about one half to one third of 
all OFDI projects in number terms.
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Figure 2     Geographical distribution of China’s OFDI stock, 2003–07
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ers often do not have the same power, but nonowners like the 
secretary of the Communist Party Committee within each firm 
often have that power and more, while the senior management 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is appointed directly by the 
Party. These considerations make it hard to definitively assess 
the motives and incentives affecting these firms. However, the 
commercial pressures on Chinese companies are growing rapid-
ly, and the similarities between Chinese firms’ considerations 
and those of OECD-country firms are mounting faster than 
the differences. The number of parties involved in the invest-
ment  decision-making  process  is  swelling  accordingly.  Aside 
from in-house staff, significant players in the process include 
domestic and international service firms, domestic government 
bodies that provide investment-related services and incentives, 
a broad range of foreign investment promotion agencies (IPAs), 
and corporate foreign partners. On the financing side, partners 
include commercial banks and private equity firms, as well as 
local governments, policy banks, and other government-backed 
funds. 
THE GLOBAL WEIGHT OF CHINESE OFDI
Extensive media coverage of Chinese OFDI deals has provoked 
worries  that  Chinese  firms  are  buying  up  the  world.  These 
concerns  are  exaggerated:  China’s  role  as  a  global  investor 
remains minor in terms of both annual FDI flows and total 
FDI stock. From 000–07 average Chinese outflows accounted 
for less than 1 percent of global flows annually, far below the 
share of the OECD economies and less than other transitional 
economies such as Russia (table 1).17 China’s 007 outbound 
investment was comparable with Austria’s and the Netherlands’, 
while US investment flows were 1 times larger than China’s.
The story for China’s share of global FDI stock is simi-
lar. Global FDI has grown at a rate similar to Chinese FDI, 
so China’s global share in 007 was only 0.6 percent, roughly 
17. All global comparators are from UNCTAD’s FDI database, which uses 
slightly different numbers for Chinese OFDI in recent years than MOFCOM 
and SAFE. 
Figure 3     M&A in China’s OFDI profile, 2000–2008
Note: The share of direct M&A in 2008 is exceptionally low because several major deals were executed through 
special purpose vehicles. The M&A sample includes only completed, direct, cross-border deals with a stake of more 
than 10 percent; the M&A deal volume only includes deals with a disclosed value.

















  Greenfield and undisclosed/third-country M&A (right axis)
  Other M&A deals (right axis)
  Top 3 M&A deals (right axis)









88N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4                                                                                                               Ju Ne   2 0 0 9

the same as a decade ago (figure ). In 007 China’s OFDI 
stock surpassed that of Luxembourg and was approaching that 
of Finland. The OFDI stock of the United States was about 30 
times that of China. The per-capita OFDI stock in China was 
approximately $70 in 007, compared to $5 in India, $6,100 
in the United Arab Emirates, $9,300 in the United States, and 
$15,000 in Germany.
While emerging economies do not account for a signifi-
cant share of global FDI today, their modest baselines mean that 
they will be important drivers of new cross-border investment 
in  coming  years.18  Among  these  emerging-market  countries, 
China demands the most attention given its size, unique public-
private hybrid economy, and because it is well positioned to 
significantly increase its outbound investment in the coming 
years. China is also notable for the countercyclical nature of its 
OFDI flows: In 008 China’s OFDI doubled while global FDI 
flows dropped an estimated 0–30 percent. 
FDI in China’s Global Investment Footprint
Other elements of China’s international investment position 
provide context for the size of the country’s outbound FDI. 
In 008 China had an OFDI stock of $170 billion, compared 
to  $.75  trillion  in  other  assets,  primarily  foreign  exchange 
reserves (figure 5). Despite the rapid growth of China’s OFDI, it 
is important to emphasize that China’s net FDI position is still 
negative, with an inward FDI stock of $876 billion compared 
with an outbound stock of only $170 billion in 008, leaving 
18. See Sauvant (005) or UNCTAD (006) for a discussion of the new role 
of multinational corporations from emerging economies as global investors.
net FDI liabilities of $706 billion. There are $5 of FDI assets 
under foreign ownership in China for every $1 of Chinese direct 
investment assets abroad. 
China is not only a net importer of FDI, but the gap 
between FDI inflows and outflows has consistently widened over 
the past years. Inflows have grown much faster than outflows, 
and SAFE’s Balance of Payments records a doubling of net FDI 
inflows from approximately $50 billion in 00 to an average of 
$100 billion in 007 and 008. Due to decreasing FDI inflows 
as a result of the financial crisis and several large-volume natural 
resources deals, this gap may significantly diminish in 009, 
but any drop will likely be temporary, and China’s road toward 
a sustainable and significant net FDI export volume is still a few 
years ahead.19 
CHANGING DRIVERS AND MOTIVES OF CHINA’S OFDI
The rapid growth of Chinese OFDI is a result of economic 
necessity, as China’s shift to a new model of economic growth is 
pushing firms from all sectors of its economy abroad. China has 
averaged 9 percent GDP growth per year for the past 30 years. 
When the country entered its period of extensive economic 
reform in 1978, per capita income was approximately $00 
a  year,  domestic  consumption  was  limited  to  basic  necessi-
ties, production capacity had collapsed relative to other East 
Asian—let alone OECD—economies, and infrastructure was 
primitive.  China  has  been  able  to  achieve  rapid  growth  by 
quickly ramping up the scale of production in manufacturing 
and by restarting investment flows. Throughout the 1990s the 
processing trade (importing intermediates for light processing 
and then exporting them) grew significantly, but net exports did 
not become a major component of China’s GDP growth until 
00. By 008 massive domestic investment and growing trade 
surpluses were the principle engines of expansion.
In this growth model, outbound investment played two 
limited roles.0 First, OFDI helped to establish the infrastruc-
ture needed to integrate China into the global trading system by 
improving the country’s logistics and establishing foreign offices 
for China’s trading firms. Second, OFDI was used to secure the 
commodity inputs needed for growth. Infrastructure projects, 
urbanization, and production for domestic and foreign consump-
tion drove domestic demand for iron, oil, cement, timber, and 
many other resources that are not abundant in China, and the 
country became a net importer of many of these commodities 
19. According to monthly MOFCOM statistics, inbound FDI to China was 
down seven months in a row from October 008 to April 009, averaging a 
year-on-year decline of around 0 percent.
0. For an early assessment of China’s outbound investment profile, see Cai 
(1999).
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Figure 5     China’s international investment position, 2004–08
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in the 1990s. Chinese firms, backed by official concerns about 
supply security, began to pursue global resource deals. 
OFDI in a Rebalanced Economy
China has entered a period of economic adjustment as it transi-
tions from this old growth model to a new one, a change popu-
larly referred to as “rebalancing.” China’s old model relied on 
investing in ever-greater production scale and, since 00, on 
large trade surpluses. Rebalanced growth, if it can be achieved, 
requires increasing household income and domestic consump-
tion, while manufacturing growth must focus on greater value-
added production rather than on further increases in the scale 
of production (Lardy 007, He and Kujis 007). 
The  implications  for  China’s  OFDI  of  this  transforma-
tion of the country’s economic growth model are profound. 
With domestic economies of scale already maxed out, China’s 
firms must capture a greater share of the production chain, 
both  upstream  and  downstream  from  their  factories,  which 
often means going abroad. The microeconomic implications 
of rebalancing for the business segments described below are 
only reinforced by the macroeconomic adjustments that would 
arise from this new growth model. Currently foreign currency 
earned by exporters must be exchanged for renminbi once on 
shore. This is required in order to manage the exchange rate, 
and it makes reinvesting that foreign exchange Beijing’s prob-
lem. Governments are usually limited to investing in securi-
ties, but firms are able to make direct investments that must 
then be managed as businesses. As rebalanced growth reduces 
reliance on exports, Beijing will no longer need to absorb as 
much foreign exchange to manage its exchange rate, leaving it 
to firms to decide how to use the dollars they earn.1 Finally, this 
macroeconomic rebalancing is self-reinforcing because a stron-
ger renminbi means greater purchasing power abroad, another 
incentive for outbound investment. 
1. See Pettis (005) for a discussion of the monetary policy benefits of 
outbound investment. 
. For an early analysis of the impact of exchange rate appreciation on direct 
investment, see Cushman (1985).
Natural Resources: Here to Stay
Outbound investment in natural resources will remain a very 
important component of China’s OFDI in the future, although 
it is likely to fall in relative terms. Urbanization is incomplete: 
Only 5 percent of the population is urban, well below the 
global average and half the OECD level. Another 600 million 
people must migrate to urban areas before the minimum agri-
cultural labor force of 100 million to 150 million is reached. 
Chinese  resource  firms  have  a  huge  interest  in  extraction 
investments abroad due to limited domestic deposits of most 
resources except for coal. Capital constraints and consolidation 
in the mining industry globally provide Chinese firms with 
an opportunity to take major stakes in established firms with 
good reputations and extensive experience in countries such 
as  Australia and  Canada, instead  of  in high-risk  projects  in 
unstable countries. New resource priorities are also emerging, 
for instance, in low-carbon energy, including natural gas, and in 
overseas farmland to offset the limited arable land in China.3
Heavy Industry: Outsourcing Production
Heavy  industrial  capacity  has  expanded  massively  in  China 
since  00,  bringing  an  abundance  of  industrial  goods  but 
many  problems  as  well.  Heavy  industrial  manufacturing 
requires extensive financing but creates few jobs, causes envi-
ronmental  damage,  and  aggravates  energy-security  concerns 
(Rosen and Houser 007). Rebalancing growth entails shifting 
capital from these sectors to more labor-intensive light manu-
facturing and services, where China’s comparative advantage 
lies. China will need to rely on imports for a larger share of 
its heavy industrial needs than in recent years. In addition to 
the traditional logic of trade specialization, this greater reliance 
on imports will be prompted by China’s need to minimize its 
energy footprint and to cut its carbon emissions from produc-
tion. China’s heavy industrial production in the current decade 
has entailed the energy-intensive, long-distance transportation 
of both raw materials (such as iron ore) and energy resources to 
China for initial processing. The combination of rising trans-
portation energy costs and future carbon emissions reduction 
policies will incentivize restructuring the production chain so 
that initial processing occurs nearer to resource extraction, thus 
reducing carbon emissions. “Made in China” will be replaced by 
“made by China—abroad,” as Chinese firms have already begun 
to build smelters, refineries, and other heavy industrial facilities 
3. For a discussion of cross-border FDI in agricultural land, see Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick (009).
The biggest drag on China’s firms is that 
they do not possess the management skills 
needed for long-term investments abroad.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4   J u Ne   2 0 0 9
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abroad, a process Beijing has encouraged. Domestic Chinese 
investment in energy-intensive heavy industrial activities grew 
by an average of 30 percent per year over the past five years 
(figure 6). This growth is likely to continue, but a significant 
share of future investment will take place abroad.
Manufacturing: Finding the Other 80 Percent of the 
Value Chain
While heavy industry will maintain its share of Chinese OFDI, 
outbound investment by China’s mid-market manufacturers is 
poised to take off. The gains from increasing the scale of produc-
tion have played out, external consumer demand growth is flat, 
and lower-wage countries are increasingly taking market share 
at the low end. To survive the current crisis, China’s manufac-
turers must capture a larger share of the value chain. For a typi-
cal product manufactured in China, less than 0 percent of the 
final profit margin is captured by the Chinese manufacturer; the 
rest is enjoyed downstream in distribution, marketing, retail, 
and customer relations or upstream in product design, qual-
ity control, sourcing, branding, and research and development. 
. Recently announced or realized projects include a slab steel smelter in Bra-
zil (a project abandoned in 009), oil refineries in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, 
and an aluminum smelter in Trinidad and Tobago. 
These margins are obviously higher in foreign markets where 
consumers have a per capita income of $0,000 per year than in 
China with $3,000 per capita. In addition, China’s manufactur-
ers will pursue greater profit by improving the sophistication of 
their operations, which similarly points abroad. The hard-to-
replicate elements of economic value-added activity are intel-
lectual property, intangible brand value, and human resources 
with global operating talent. All three factors are abundant in 
the OECD countries but relatively scarce in China. 
Both of these imperatives—upgrading the sophistication 
of Chinese manufacturing and competing for the most lucra-
tive portions of the value chain—create powerful incentives 
for China’s firms to go abroad. New outbound investment will 
target distribution networks, retail, management, high-tech and 
other professional human resources, and foreign brands (such as 
the recently announced purchase of Hummer by Tengzhong). 
This implies that the geographical distribution of China’s OFDI 
will shift toward the OECD countries. A few pioneers have 
already begun this process, including Lenovo, Haier, Sany, and 
Huawei; many others are sure to follow.5
5. We have a long-standing practice of asking Fortune 500 business execu-
tives to name three Chinese brand names that the average American would 
recognize. Few are able to do so. Some have observed that even Japan took 
time to achieve brand recognition abroad, but we note that 0 years after 
Japan began its postwar recovery, at least several dozen Japanese brands were 
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Services: Moving Beyond Trade
China’s services sector OFDI is expanding beyond trade-facili-
tation, a trend that will only be reinforced as rebalancing puts 
greater economic emphasis on this sector. In services that are 
already well developed in China, firms will take their compara-
tive  advantages  abroad.  The  construction  sector  is  a  good 
example:  Chinese  firms  have  become  serious  players  in  the 
global market for large infrastructure projects, winning presti-
gious bids such as the new Medina-Mecca railway line in Saudi 
Arabia. Overseas revenue in this sector grew from $11 billion 
in 00 to $57 billion in 008.6 In most of the higher value-
added services, domestic Chinese development is just beginning 
to take off—in healthcare, finance, information technology, and 
insurance—and China’s firms will not go abroad for market 
share so much as to build their upstream capabilities through 
improved  human  resources,  enhanced  process  and  product 
knowledge, and cobranding. 
THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT AT HOME
The commercial motives and macroeconomic forces affecting 
Chinese OFDI discussed above are now shaping Chinese policy, 
in contrast to past decades when the policy framework dictated 
the evolution of China’s OFDI. Limiting outbound investment 
in favor of domestic capital formation and the rationing of 
hard currency were the main objectives at the outset of China’s 
reform  era,  which  produced  an  interventionist  regulatory 
framework that gradually opened the door to Chinese OFDI, at 
least for some state firms.7 In the late 1990s the Asian financial 
crisis and preparation for China’s WTO accession precipitated 
a profound sense of China’s exposure to globalization and with 
it a greater awareness of the importance of outward investment. 
A breakthrough “Go Global” policy, first announced in 1999 
and implemented over the following years, resulted in more-
active encouragement and support from the government for 
overseas investments (appendix  table 1). The transformation 
of the domestic policy framework over the past decade can be 
summarized under five broad trends:
n	 From  direct  guidance  to  regulation:  Previously  the 
Chinese government directly administered most firm-level 
household names in the United States. We are now 30 years into China’s 
reform era.
6. Revenue numbers from “overseas contractual projects” are released quar-
terly by MOFCOM. 
7. See Voss, Buckley, and Cross (009) for a more extensive review of 
Chinese policy and its impact on OFDI. Other major concerns that shaped 
China’s OFDI policy were maintaining the government’s ability to regulate 
assets held beyond China’s borders and the prevailing worry that keeping assets 
abroad meant stripping them of collective ownership.
overseas  investment  decisions,  either  through  manage-
ment proxies or through an approval system in which the 
default answer was “no.” Today the state increasingly acts 
as a regulator and arbitrator instead, deferring assessment 
of the business case for OFDI to professional firm manage-
ment, a trend seen in many other areas of the economy 
as well.8 This transformation in the role of the state is by 
no means complete, and the government still extensively 
intervenes in high-profile deals. But the image of agents 
from the Politburo commanding state enterprises to “go 
buy the world” is largely fictitious.
n	 Relaxing and decentralizing approvals: Authorities have 
gradually  eased  approval  procedures,  generally  shifting 
responsibility  from  central  to  local  agencies.  The  latest 
step in this process was implemented in April of this year: 
New project approval rules effective May 1, 009, reduced 
approval  time,  lifted  value  thresholds,  and  transferred 
authority to local MOFCOM branches (see appendix  
table ).
n	 From negative to positive measures: Along with lower 
barriers, Beijing has introduced policies to actively support 
firms in going abroad. These include facilitation services, 
such as risk assessment and insurance; commercial incen-
tives, such as subsidies and tax breaks; expanded avenues 
for financing overseas operations (see below); and OFDI 
delegation  participation  to  help  bridge  credibility  and 
brand disadvantages. These supportive measures have also 
been  localized,  so  most  provinces  now  have  their  own 
budget and agencies to support firms going abroad.
n	 Relaxing  capital  controls  and  broadening  financing 
channels: Parallel to MOFCOM’s reform of the approval 
rules, SAFE has gradually relaxed capital controls and initi-
ated rules allowing firms easier access to foreign exchange 
and more opportunities to raise capital. The latest changes 
to the foreign exchange management system will come into 
effect in the summer and fall of 009 (see appendix  table 
). Other government agencies have supported SAFE’s push 
to facilitate funding for overseas ventures. Since December 
008 commercial banks have been allowed to lend firms 
money for cross-border M&A.9 A new trial program allows 
designated big firms to lend to their overseas subsidiaries 
and to make direct investments up and down their produc-
8. For a discussion of the emergence of a regulatory state in China, see 
Pearson (005).
9. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued new “Guide-
lines for Risk Management of Merger and Acquisition Loans by Commercial 
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tion chains.30 In 009 firms were permitted to issue dollar-
denominated  bonds  in  China  for  the  first  time.31  And 
both CIC and SAFE are reportedly considering expanding 
their OFDI exposure as an alternative to purchasing dollar 
securities.3 These reforms will help firms to raise money, 
but small, medium-sized, and private enterprises still have 
limited access to funds for overseas expansion.
n	 Integrating  OFDI  and  broader  foreign  policy:  Until 
recently, the maxim most often used to describe China’s 
OFDI  to  many  developing  nations  was  “no  strings 
attached,” in contrast to OECD-country investors, who are 
often compelled to consider the geopolitical and socioeco-
nomic implications of their investments. But Beijing has 
discovered that this selling point comes with a cost. Anti-
Chinese sentiment in host countries and concerns articu-
lated by third-country governments and nongovernmental 
organizations have forced an internal debate between the 
steward of China’s new-found soft power, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and those concerned only with 
maximizing overseas access. As a result the foreign-policy 
tools used to support Chinese OFDI have become more 
sophisticated. Instead of simple oilfield diplomacy to push 
strategically important deals, outreach now includes condi-
tional overseas development assistance, loans from policy 
banks coupled with service contracts or equity stakes for 
Chinese firms, missions and delegations to OECD coun-
tries  to  identify  win-win  investment  opportunities,  and 
more-intense  efforts  to  conclude  bilateral  and  regional 
agreements with investment codicils.33
The Reform Path Ahead 
Trends in China’s OFDI policy environment reflect the chang-
ing value attached to such flows by policymakers, who consider 
OFDI  strategically  supportive  of  China’s  interests,  its  role, 
30. We learned this from interviews in Beijing and Shanghai in November 
008. We have heard this program referred to as the “corporate qualified 
domestic institutional investor program.” 
31. In April China National Petroleum Corporation received approval to issue 
$3 billion in three-year dollar bonds in the Shanghai interbank market.
3. After the poor performance of several investments, CIC recently signaled 
interest in diversifying its overseas portfolio by funding Chinese firms’ overseas 
acquisitions. In February 009 Fang Shangpu, the deputy director of SAFE, 
announced that SAFE is considering direct investments as an alternative to 
purchasing treasuries or foreign equities.
33. Aside from expanding bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment-
relevant free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries, China has 
entered BIT negotiations with the United States and reached an investment 
agreement with Taiwan. For an examination of China’s new generation of 
investment treaties, see Schill (007). 
and its reputation in the world and essential to the long-term 
competitiveness of Chinese firms, on which the nation ulti-
mately depends for its wages and tax base. Despite past reforms, 
the liberalization process is far from complete. From a firm 
perspective, four residual reforms are needed to optimize the 
policy environment for OFDI in China:3
n	 Completing the shift from an approval to a registration 
system: The state must completely pull back from active 
intervention  in  firms’  investment  decisions  and  permit 
firms to make these decisions based on their own commer-
cial  assessments  and  risk  appetites.  The  abolishment  of 
ultimate  government  control  must  be  compensated  for 
by the implementation of a better corporate governance 
system that allows shareholders more control over invest-
ment decisions.
n	 Liberalizing foreign exchange purchases and improving 
financing opportunities:  The  government  must  permit 
firms to freely access and use foreign exchange for OFDI 
and ultimately allow a fully convertible currency. These 
steps must be complemented by reforms allowing firms 
to use basic financial innovations, such as bonds, to raise 
cash for overseas expansion and introducing new financing 
instruments, such as convertible debt or stock swaps. 
n	 Creating  a  nondiscriminatory  OFDI  framework:  The 
Chinese government must initiate a corporate “affirmative 
action”  program  that  creates  a  transparent  and  nondis-
criminatory framework for all firms regardless of their size 
and ownership, both for restrictive and supportive policies. 
OFDI opportunities must be opened to entities that are 
currently not permitted to invest overseas, such as indi-
viduals and partnerships.
n	 Formulating a global strategy that better serves China’s 
long-term interests: Shielding pariah-state governments 
or providing “no strings attached” loans to the developing 
world might help some of the established OFDI players, 
but it hurts the reputation of China’s firms among consum-
ers and thus harms the interests of China’s next generation 
of OFDI investors.
China  will  have  to  make  further  progress  in  the  areas 
mentioned above to effectively promote and sustain the overseas 
expansion of its firms. The reasons the above steps have not yet 
been taken place lie in the complicated domestic political econ-
omy for reform and the deep-seated reluctance to abandon tools 
used to maintain the state’s influence over the economy, natural 
3. This list is based on our interviews with industry executives, lawyers, 
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resources, and industrial policy. But as liberalization over the 
past decade has shown, the costs of reform are outweighed by 
the benefits, and domestic policy is rapidly changing to accom-
modate those benefits. If the past liberalization path is inter-
rupted and cross-border investment openness is rolled back, 
then the Chinese economy stands to lose the most. 
BARRIERS AND IMPEDIMENTS
Given the growing commercial necessity to go abroad and the 
generally positive policy environment, Chinese OFDI is poised 
to grow on a large scale. The actual pace of this development, 
however, depends on how well corporate China can deal with 
the domestic and foreign impediments it currently faces.
Investment Reviews in Host Countries
Chinese policymakers and executives usually point to protec-
tionism and high host-country entry barriers as the principal 
impediments to Chinese OFDI. Most OECD countries have 
regulatory mechanisms in place to prevent potentially harmful 
investments, and many governments have tightened investment 
rules in recent years, largely in response to the emergence of 
new investors from China and the Middle East (figure 7). In 
theory such policies are legitimate measures for sovereign states 
to protect their national security interests and they should not 
be a serious concern for foreign investors provided that the off-
limit sectors are clearly defined and the review process is trans-
parent and nondiscriminatory.35 However, the reality in many 
countries does not meet the ideal: Investment protectionism 
is on the rise, investment rules are not very transparent, and 
review processes are politicized by domestic interest groups.
China has borne the brunt of these suboptimal rules and 
politicized  domestic  debates,  most  prominently  in  the  case 
of  China  National  Offshore  Oil  Corporation’s  (CNOOC) 
attempted takeover of the US oil firm Unocal in 005. Recently 
heated debates with a strong political element have raged over 
Chinese investments in Australia (over a series of takeovers in 
the mining sector), in Korea (related to the bankruptcy of the 
automaker Ssangyong), in Russia (in reaction to the Baltic Pearl 
project), and in several developing countries. 
These  examples  illustrate  that  politicized  investment 
regimes remain an issue for Chinese investors. Looking forward, 
it is likely that the changing nature of Chinese OFDI will result 
in a relative shift from traditional national security issues, such 
35. There is a broad range of proposals on principles for the design of effective 
and transparent national investment rules. See, for example, OECD (008c), 
Graham and Marchick (006), and Moran (forthcoming).
as investments in natural resources and critical infrastructure, to 
new areas, most importantly the acquisition of high-tech assets. 
National regulators will have to deal with more deals involv-
ing security-relevant technology transfer to Chinese companies 
such as Huawei’s bid for the US network manufacturer 3Com in 
007. This shift will also open new opportunities for domestic 
groups to politicize the debate, as some of the coming deals will 
also result in the reorganization of global value chains, includ-
ing the transfer of jobs and technology to China.36 The regional 
shift of OFDI toward OECD economies could also return the 
complicated issue of investment subsidies to the agenda once 
the dust of the current financial crisis has settled.37 
Chinese Executives’ Parochial Thinking
In the past decade, the profit margins for China’s firms, despite 
their strong export orientation, largely derived from the domes-
tic production process rather than from distribution and service 
provision beyond the border. Firm-level surveys in recent years 
have found that Chinese executives’ growth strategies for the 
future still largely rely on domestic markets and exports.38 In 
our interviews with Chinese firms, advisors, and academics in 
008 and 009, we found that this domestic preoccupation is 
still the norm. Business leaders discount opportunities to oper-
ate outside China and consider the risks associated with over-
seas expansion to be high compared with the perceived short-
term profit opportunities within China. Many Chinese CEOs 
have a gut feeling that they eventually need to go abroad but 
only a minority are trying to actually achieve this. At the other 
extreme, many CEOs outsource global business development 
to investment bankers who talk them into spectacular deals that 
would probably not have happened as part of a carefully devel-
oped strategy.39 The fast-changing economic realities of China’s 
new growth model will eventually affect the mindset of Chinese 
executives, but this can be accelerated with the right political 
incentives and a corporate governance structure that encourages 
long-term strategic planning.
36. See, for example, the debates in Korea surrounding Shanghai Automotive’s 
(SAIC) takeover of Ssangyong.
37. For a discussion of subsidies in cross-border M&A transactions, see 
Hufbauer, Moll, and Rubini (008).
38. For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 005) found that 
more than 90 percent of surveyed Chinese executives were planning to focus 
on the domestic market for future growth. APFC (005) and APFC and 
CCPIT (009) illustrate that a surprisingly small share of Chinese companies 
with international exposure consider direct investment in order to serve 
higher-margin markets overseas. 
39. The latest example is the announced acquisition of the US auto brand 
Hummer by the Chinese construction equipment manufacturer Tengzhong. N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4   J u Ne   2 0 0 9
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Not at Home Abroad
The biggest drag on China’s firms is that they do not possess the 
management skills needed for long-term investments abroad. 
Cross-border investments are complicated, and specialized skills 
are required to establish business strategies, to manage asset 
transactions, and to run an overseas unit. These tasks, unlike 
the  initial  acquisition,  cannot  be  outsourced  to  consultants 
and financiers. The investor must bridge any cultural divides, 
possess the necessary market knowledge, comply with differ-
ent regulatory standards and a new legal environment, manage 
expatriate and foreign staff, negotiate with organized labor and 
other stakeholders not present in China, meet quality and safety 
standards, adhere to tax and accounting rules, effectively manage 
foreign exchange risks, and have a suitable communication and 
public relations strategy. 
Many Chinese firms have the cash to go abroad but lack 
the confidence to deal with these obstacles. By comparison, it is 
easy to buy mining assets in a lightly regulated environment in 
Africa, fly in a hundred Chinese workers to extract the resources, 
and ship them back to China. It is a much greater challenge to 
run manufacturing and service operations in Atlanta, Newark, 
or Cologne. Several high-profile firms have learned the hard 
way  that  they  are  ill-equipped  to  confront  such  challenges, 
among them Shanghai Automotive (SAIC) in its venture with 
the Korean car maker Ssangyong and the steel giant Baosteel 
with its now-abandoned steel slab project in Brazil. 
The difficulties of leaving home are a seminal tenet of FDI 
theory. But because OECD-country firms come from heavily 
regulated markets, they do not have to play compliance catch-
up when they move abroad. The multicultural workforces typi-
cal in the United States and much of Europe amplify the culture 
shock felt by Chinese executives coming from overwhelmingly 
Han China. Chinese managers abroad often struggle to convey 
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Figure 7     Global policy measures toward FDI, 1992–2007
Note: These numbers represent a count of regulatory changes, not weighted by relevance or impact.
Source: UNCTAD (2008).
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the seriousness of, for example, workplace antibias rules to a 
headquarters where discrimination based on employees’ region 
of orgin, gender, sexual preference, medical conditions, physical 
disabilities, and even height is common. 
China’s  Vice  Premier  Wang  Qishan  nicely  summarized 
these weaknesses, rebutting the CEO of the Chinese machinery 
manufacturer Sany following his request for more government 
support for OFDI at an event during the National People’s 
Congress in March 009: 
Do you have a handle on your own management capa-
bilities? Have you analyzed the cultural differences of the 
two sides? Do you understand the relationship between 
unionized labor and management in that place? If the 
other side’s engineers resign, are you really going to send 
people from Changsha [Hunan’s capital] overseas, and 
make the whole company speak Hunanese [the local 
dialect]?  If  you  don’t  know  yourself  and  know  your 
opponent, then this kind of confidence scares me.0
Stop & Go: The Domestic Political Economy
Domestic politics remains a barrier to overseas expansion as well. 
Despite the structural liberalization of the regulatory framework 
described above, Chinese firms still must seek approval for every 
single investment they make overseas, and projects can be vetoed 
by government bodies for any number of institutional motives: 
fear that bureaucrats would be held accountable for failures, 
concerns about hot money outflows, worries about state asset 
losses or backdoor privatization, or anxiety about unemploy-
ment and shifting jobs to lower-wage countries. 
Even if a deal is approved in the end, the involvement of 
various government bodies with volatile attitudes toward over-
seas projects often delays decisions and makes the process much 
more resource intense and time consuming than it should be.1 
In the fierce competition for global assets, Chinese firms are 
0. Rick Carew, “Will China Buy the World? The Beijing Debate,” Wall Street 
Journal’s WSJ Blog, China Journal, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/china-
journal (accessed on June 11, 009). 
1. Many executives and consultants we interviewed complained that local 
MOFCOM and SAFE bureaus often do not have the capacity to follow the 
written rules and adhere to approval periods.
at a significant disadvantage if they must wait several weeks or 
months for approval of overseas projects. It not only hampers 
individual firms’ strategic planning but also damages the global 
reputation of all Chinese firms if an investment is withdrawn 
after a waiting period of several months, as seen with the Bank 
of China’s proposed investment in the French bank Rothschild 
earlier this year, which was withdrawn after it failed to obtain 
approval from the Chinese authorities.
In  addition  to  these  bureaucratic  traps,  top-level  senti-
ment  is  important  in  a  nation  where  political  favoritism  is 
often  the  linchpin  of  business.  While  policy  has  moved  to 
support overseas investment, politics have often blown in the 
other direction in recent years. Despite encouragement to “go 
global,”  CIC’s  money-losing  investment  in  the  Blackstone 
group and CNOOC’s face-losing bid for Unocol were met with 
public admonition and even popular accusations of treason. 
The global financial crisis rekindled expectations that China 
would be buying, but lost value in US securities and another 
poorly performing investment in a US financial firm, this time 
Morgan Stanley, again turned the tide, prompting statements 
from Beijing that investment in distressed sectors abroad would 
be off limit. At present it again seems that the political wind 
is  blowing  outward,  carrying  delegations  to  “bottom  fish” 
the United States and Europe. Yet the callousness with which 
Beijing has blocked a number of inward investments in the past 
raises questions about its seriousness toward cross-border invest-
ments both ways. 
CONCLUSIONS
In light of the changing trajectory and nature of China’s outward 
direct investment we draw five principal conclusions with policy 
implications for US and other OECD policymakers. 
First, the motives and targets of China’s OFDI are chang-
ing rapidly, driven more by a readjustment in China’s economic 
growth model than by political considerations. This insight is 
important for its own sake, because it impacts how we inter-
pret  Chinese  investment  patterns.  But  more  pointedly,  the 
focus of Chinese OFDI will shift toward commercial opera-
tions in advanced economies rather than the traditional focus 
on resource extraction in developing countries. This will make 
existing  ambiguities  in  OECD  countries’  investment  review 
processes  more  problematic.  These  ambiguities  have  been 
explored elsewhere (Graham and Marchick 006), and the US 
Treasury Department has improved upon guidance in recent 
. The blocking of Coca-Cola’s bid for Huiyuan, a juice maker, under the 
thin pretext of antimonopoly laws, is an egregious recent example. 
Many Chinese CEOs have a gut feeling that 
they eventually need to go abroad but only a 
minority are trying to actually achieve this.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4   J u Ne   2 0 0 9
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years,3 but the essential problem remains that Chinese firms do 
not know what the United States considers to be sensitive on 
national security grounds, and pursuing an investment without 
such clarity is potentially costly and embarrassing. 
Recently there has been public discussion in Beijing about 
“using” corporate OFDI as an alternative to traditional foreign 
exchange reserve portfolio management. Because veiled threats 
have been made by some Chinese officials to use traditional 
foreign exchange operations, such as treasury bill holdings, to 
exert pressure in foreign relations, talk about using OFDI as a 
reserves management tool easily gives rise to national security 
concerns  about  inward  investment  from  China. We  empha-
size, however, that FDI is illiquid and cannot be withdrawn in 
the event of hostilities. But while these concerns are therefore 
misguided, they are nonetheless popular. The danger of foregone 
investment flows, national recriminations, and tit-for-tat retali-
ation will only mount until this issue is adequately addressed. 
The issue has been exhaustively debated, but it takes on addi-
tional urgency in light of the structural forces that will drive 
rapidly increasing Chinese OFDI in future years, the need for 
new sources of investment in the United States due to impaired 
domestic finances, and the balance of payments disparity between 
surplus China and the deficit United States. Existing schemes of 
evaluating national security risks based on rational argumenta-
tion should be applied rigorously and in a way that is transparent 
for potential Chinese investors (Moran forthcoming).
Second, the consensus against including national economic 
security among the grounds for investment reviews will come 
under  renewed  pressure  due  to  the  exceptional  degree  of 
government involvement in the corporate and financial sectors 
in China. The concern here is that even without the intent or 
capacity  to  threaten  traditional  national  security  interests,  a 
large volume of M&A bids for US businesses by Chinese firms, 
which  face  fewer  budget  constraints  due  to  their  privileged 
access to preferential loans and other financial subsidies, could 
undermine the efficiency and equity of the US marketplace. 
3. See, for example, the revision of Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) rules in December 008.
. Whether in fact China’s financial system does act as a subsidy channel 
either in general or for specific firms is a matter of real disagreement. The case 
can be made that it does, but it is not clear that the manner in which it does 
Other concerns center on bad business practices and white-
collar crime, technology transfers perceived as “asset stripping,” 
and potential job losses.5 The main arguments made in the 
past against broadening investment review to cover economic 
security are based on the difficulty of defining and implement-
ing such a review without inviting endless protectionist use of 
the system by vested interests opposed to foreign investment for 
purely self-interested reasons. These arguments do not, however, 
claim that there is no economic security concern, but merely that 
existing ideas about how to deal with such concerns are unwork-
able (Graham and Marchick 006, 17–73). As in the case of 
CNOOC’s aborted bid for Unocal, the compelling concern will 
continue to be economic unfairness due to subsidized access to 
finance, and if host countries do not have an explicit system for 
dealing with those concerns then the temptation to find spuri-
ous grounds to disrupt investment overtures will prevail.6 
Third, China’s firms are late to globalize compared with 
their OECD-country peers, and China has more to gain than 
any  other  country  from  sustaining  cross-border  investment 
openness and more to lose if these flows are choked off. OECD-
country firms are already globally present, typically in as many 
as 0 host nations (UNCTAD 008). It is China’s firms that 
have not yet applied for their passports. For this reason the 
coming decade will offer a unique opportunity to work with 
China to improve the existing global structures governing cross-
border investment. China must play a major part in discussions 
to alleviate aversion to FDI, both because it has the most to lose 
from a failure to maintain international openness and because 
its domestic industrial-policy aspirations are a source of concern 
for others. This implies that China can be expected to shoul-
der part of the burden for maintaining forward momentum in 
global investment regimes, on bilateral investment treaties, and 
on its own domestic openness to FDI. 
Because Chinese OFDI will play such a large role at the 
margin, it will have a disproportionate impact on the political 
meets the standard for actionable subsidies under existing trade agreements. 
If it does act as a subsidy channel, should this be treated as grounds to block 
investment bids, or merely as a welcome offer to overpay the shareholders of 
targeted companies?
5. See Graham and Krugman (1995) for a discussion of such fears related to 
the wave of Japanese FDI in the late 1980s. 
6. The argument that (a) competitive pressures from domestic-market 
competition are the primary driver of outbound Chinese investment and (b) 
government control and subsidies for corporate China are a rising concern for 
host-country reviewers may seem contradictory to some. It is not; both argu-
ments are valid. Even in state-owned oligopoly industries, like oil, state giants 
behave in a profit-oriented manner. They maximize their access to government 
favoritism, but do not always heed the call to serve government purposes. And 
while they share ultimate ownership by the state, they compete aggressively 
with one another both at home and abroad. This is described in detail in 
Rosen and Houser (007). Beijing has generally chosen competition before 
(and in some cases, without) privatization. 
The motives and targets of China’s OFDI 
are changing rapidly, driven more by a 
readjustment in China’s economic growth 
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economy  of  developing-country  hosts,  for  better  or  worse. 
It is not China’s relative share of investment to a given host 
that matters but its share in the current period. If the Chinese 
government  explicitly  rejects  any  notion  of  conditionality 
or  discipline  on  corrupt  practices,  then  these  large  new 
investment flows from Chinese firms could destabilize fragile 
host-countries, and the blame will redound to China. This has 
precipitated a debate on whether “no strings attached” is in 
China’s best interests (Zha 005), and domestic policymakers 
have begun to discuss and to draft rules for more-responsible 
overseas business conduct.7 We conclude that China will be 
increasingly  amenable  to  cooperating  with  OECD-country 
efforts to manage the unintended consequences of FDI, and the 
case for such alignment of interests should be emphasized.
Fourth, China’s particular imperative to catch up in terms 
of its global investment presence should be viewed in light of the 
country’s importance for a range of issues beyond the FDI sphere. 
Global investment flows can help to solve a range of issues, 
including the restoration of global growth following the current 
financial crisis, poverty alleviation, rebalancing macroeconomic 
growth patterns in China and abroad, and mitigating climate 
change. This last point requires some elaboration. Conducting 
every step of industrial processing in China does not make sense 
from a carbon-minimization perspective, since it entails the high 
energy-intensity  transportation  of  unprocessed  raw  materials 
over long distances. By investing in first-stage processing closer 
to resource-extraction areas, Chinese firms can retain the verti-
cal integration they aspire to while significantly reducing total 
carbon intensity. Such restructuring of production chains while 
retaining Chinese firm involvement through OFDI are already 
a subject of analysis in Beijing according to our conversations 
with government economists in 008 and 009.
Fifth, maximizing the benefits of foreign direct investment 
must begin with better statistical clarity. Improving the qual-
ity of China’s OFDI data may not be exciting for policymakers 
7. For example, MOFCOM and the Ministry for Environmental Protection 
(MEP) are reportedly working on environmental guidelines for Chinese firms’ 
overseas projects. 
looking for big ideas on engagement with China, but none of 
the geoeconomically important recommendations above can be 
pursued without expeditious improvements in China’s statisti-
cal tracking of its outbound FDI. Managing national security 
and national economic security concerns in advanced econo-
mies requires better Chinese data on who is investing, where 
the investment is made, and who controls investment decisions. 
Efforts to work with China to prevent negative consequences 
from  large  investment  flows  into  fragile  developing-country 
economies requires, at a bare minimum, clear data on how 
much investment is going to these countries. For want of trans-
parency on Chinese investment flows and investors, the United 
States and other OECD nations will insist on vague and flexible 
investment review mechanisms that are prone to be abused and 
sure to provoke grievances in China.
Finally,  an  accurate  understanding  of  China’s  overseas 
investment profile provides a useful reminder to US and other 
policymakers that China is not yet an across-the-board peer. To 
maximize its interests China will need help from more-expe-
rienced firms and individuals who know how to operate away 
from home, and cooperation from other governments to not 
only sustain but to enhance openness for cross-border invest-
ment. OECD-country firms compete globally; China’s firms 
compete at home and as exporters with foreign value-chain 
partners. The more China operates abroad, the more its firms 
are met on a level playing field, rather than on their skewed 
home turf. The experience from this overseas interaction will 
make Chinese firms worldlier and, if well handled by leaders, 
will make China less threatening to its economic partners. In 
this light, China’s outbound FDI has all the elements for top-
level attention: local benefits as a source of funding in tough 
economic times, national significance as a component of rebal-
ancing China’s balance of payments position, and international 
importance as a moderating factor in how China perceives and 
is perceived by the world.
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APPENDIX 1     MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY CHINESE FIRMS












Financials   1  1 0 0  1  1
Raw materials   1    1   1
Energy and power  1        1
Industrials 1 10  1  0 0 0 1 1
High technology 1 1 10 1  1 1 0  11
Consumer products/ 
   services
    0 0 0 0  
Media and  
   entertainment
1 1  0 1 0  0 

Consumer staples     0 1 0 1 0 
Telecommunications     0 0 0 0 1 
Healthcare    0 0 0 1 0 11 
Retail  0 1 0 1 0 0 0  
Real estate  1 0 1 0 0 0 0  
Total 1  1   1 11 10 0
*Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda.
Note: Includes only direct, cross-border M&A with a Chinese buyer and a final stake of 10 percent or more.
Source: Thomson Financial.
Table 2     M&A deals by industry of the Chinese acquirer  (number of deals)
Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Percent 
of total
Financials  10    1  1 1 1  
Raw materials 0 1  1     1 1 1
High technology       10 1   1
Energy and power 1          1
Industrials 1     10     11
Consumer products/ 
   services
  0 1       
Media and  
   entertainment
0 0 0 1 1     0 
Consumer staples 0 1  1  1 1   1 
Telecommunications  1  0 1 1 0  0 1 
Real estate 0 1  0 0 1 1  1 11 
Healthcare 0 1  0  0 0   10 
Retail 1 0 1  0 0 0  1  
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0
Total   1 1      0
Note: Includes only direct, cross-border M&A with a Chinese buyer and a final stake of 10 percent or more.
Source: Thomson Financial.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4   J u Ne   2 0 0 9
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APPENDIX 2     CHINA’S OFDI POLICY FRAMEWORK
Table 1     Phases of China’s OFDI policy
Phase 1: Tight controls
1–1
Restrictive attitude toward OFDI due to ideological skepticism, inexperience, and 
low foreign exchange reserves. Only specially designated trade corporations could 
apply for OFDI projects. No regulatory framework was existent; firms had to apply 
for direct, high-level approval from the State Council on a case-by-case basis. 
Phase : Cautious encouragement 
1–11
As global markets gained more importance, the government gradually started 
to encourage OFDI projects that generated foreign technology, control over 
resources, access to overseas markets, and foreign currency. The first regulatory 
framework for OFDI was drafted in 1-, allowing companies other than 
trading firms to apply for OFDI projects. However foreign exchange reserves were 
still at a low level and only firms that earned foreign exchange from overseas 
activities could qualify for OFDI projects.
Phase : Active encouragement 
1–1
The post-Tiananmen decision to accelerate economic reforms and global 
integration led to a policy of more active encouragement of OFDI. The goal was to 
increase the competitiveness of Chinese businesses, with a special focus on 100 
plus state-owned national champions. The foreign exchange regime shifted from 
an “earn-to-use” to a “buy-to-use” policy and the OFDI approval procedures were 
gradually eased and localized. 
Phase : Stepping back 
1–1
Government tightened regulatory processes for OFDI projects and recentralized 
foreign exchange acquisition against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis, 
which revealed that many firms had used OFDI projects for illegal and speculative 
transactions, leading to heavy losses of state assets and foreign exchange 
reserves.
Phase : Formulation & implementation of the  
 “going global” policy 
000–00
In anticipation of WTO accession and growing competition in domestic markets, 
policymakers returned to their previous stance of encouraging OFDI and 
announced a policy package aiming at supporting Chinese firms from various 
sectors to “go abroad”.
In 00, the regulatory process was reformed and foreign exchange controls were 
further eased and localized. Central officials and local governments begun to 
provide broad and active political and practical assistance for firms with overseas 
expansion plans.
Phase : Growing political support for 
transnational corporations and a new push for 
liberalization 
00–present
Policymakers’ support for outbound FDI further increased both because of China’s 
massive foreign exchange reserves (surpassing $1 trillion in 00) and the need to 
build up competitive transportational corporations to sustain a change in China’s 
economic growth model. A new regulatory framework implemented in May 00 
further eased and decentralized the approval procedures. New rules proposed by 
SAFE in the same month will significantly ease the foreign exchange management 
for overseas projects and broaden the sources of financing available for outbound 
investment.
Source: Authors’ compilation from policy documents, and Voss et al. (00).N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 1 4                                                                                                               Ju Ne   2 0 0 9
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APPENDIX 2     CHINA’S OFDI POLICY FRAMEWORK (continued)
Table 2     The 2009 changes in the regulatory framework for OFDI
Project approval
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
Administrative measures on regulation 
   of outbound investment 
Effective May 1, 00
n	 All outbound investments need to be submitted to MOFCOM for approval; outbound 
investment is defined as (a) establishing new overseas firms; (b) merging with, 
acquiring, or obtaining controlling stakes in an existing firm; or (c) reinvestment in an 
existing overseas subsidiary.
n  An investment needs to be approved by central MOFCOM if the investment volume 
exceeds $100 million, involves an offshore purpose vehicle for the purpose of listing 
overseas, if it concerns the interests of multiple countries, or if the investment is to 
take place in a politically sensitive territory (as defined in a list by MOFCOM and other 
relevant authorities).
n	 An investment needs approval by provincial-level MOFCOM authorities if the 
investment volume is between $10 million and $100 million, or if the investment is 
made in the areas of energy and natural resources.
n   If the investment is below $10 million and does not meet any of the above mentioned 
criteria, it qualifies for a special approval procedure: The application can be submitted 
electronically to the responsible MOFCOM bureau (local offices for local firms, central 
MOFCOM for centrally administered firms); the approval process should not take more 
than three business days.
n  If approved, firms get an outbound investment certificate, which they can use for the 
following  years to proceed with other necessary formalities, for example foreign 
exchange purchase or bank loans.
n  In addition to MOFCOM approval, investors must also consider the interests of other 
competent government agencies, if applicable; this includes entities such as National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE), the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), or industry regulators such as the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) or the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). 
Foreign exchange management
State Administration of Foreign 
   Exchange (SAFE) 
Draft regulations of foreign exchange 
   administration for domestic  
   enterprises’ overseas direct 
   investments
Draft rules published for comment in 
May 00
n  Firms will no longer have to submit an application including the source of funding for 
approval to SAFE; instead, companies must register at the local SAFE bureau and can 
report the funding source after the investment took place.
n  Companies will be allowed to use a broader range of funding sources for overseas 
investments than in the past: they can use their own foreign exchange, recycle retained 
profits from overseas, and purchase foreign exchange with renminbi; renminbi-
denominated OFDI will also be permitted on a trial basis.
n  Domestic institutions will be allowed to provide loans, financing guarantees, and 
follow-up financing for overseas firms in which they are invested.
n  Remittances will only have to be registered ex post instead of being approved in 
advance, and early-stage expenses of up to 1 percent of the total investment volume 
will be allowed.
n  SAFE will further streamline its administrative procedures with other regulatory 
authorities; there will be an annual joint examination of outbound FDI projects 
together with MOFCOM.
State Administration of Foreign 
   Exchange (SAFE) 
Notice on the administration of cross- 
   border loans by domestic enterprises
Effective August 1, 00
n  All firms that meet certain standards will be allowed to make cross-border loans to 
overseas units.
n  Eligible firms can transfer up to 0 percent of the value of their total equity to offshore 
subsidiaries.
n	 The permitted sources of loan funds include firms’ own foreign exchange reserves, 
renminbi-purchased foreign exchange, and other funds approved by local SAFE 
bureaus.
Source: Authors’ compilation from policy documents.